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Financial derivatives come in many shapes and forms, including futures, forwards, swaps, 
options, structured debt obligations and deposits, and various combinations thereof. Some 
are traded on organized exchanges, whereas others arc privately negotiated transactions. 
Derivatives have become an integral part of the financial markets because they can serve 
several economic functions. Derivatives can be used to reduce business risks, expand 
product offerings to customers, trade for profit, manage capital and funding costs, and 
alter the risk-reward profile of a particular item or an entire balance sheet.
Although derivatives are legitimate and valuable tools for banks and corporations, like all 
financial instruments they contain risks that must be managed. Managing these risks 
should not be considered unique or singular. Risks associated with derivatives are not 
new or exotic. They arc basically the same as those faced in traditional activities (e.g., 
price, interest rate, liquidity, credit risk). Fundamentally, the risk of derivatives (as of all 
financial instruments) is a function of the timing and variability of cash flows. It is very 
important to understand the various risk factors associated with business activities and to 
establish appropriate risk management systems to identify, measure, monitor, and control 
exposure and risk associated with derivatives.
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INTRODUCTION
Market deregulation, growth in global trade, and continuing technological 
developments have revolutionized the financial marketplace during the past two 
decades. A by-product of this revolution is increased market volatility, which has led to 
a corresponding increase in demand for risk management products. This demand is 
reflected in the growth of financial derivatives from the standardized futures and 
options products of the 1970s to the wide spectrum of over-the-counter (OTC) products 
offered and sold in the 1990s.
The term “derivative” encompasses any financial instrument, the value of 
which is derived from the price of some underlying asset, index or rate.1 Originally 
based on commodities, the range and usage of these instruments have increased
1 Cf, Ivanovic, Z., Financial Management, Univesity of Rijeka, Rijeka, 1997.
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dramatically to the extent that they now cover a wide range of financial products (e.g. 
equities and bonds), money rates (e.g. interest and exchange rates), indices (e.g. equity 
and commodity indices) as well as “soft” commodities (e.g. coffee, sugar, cocoa, 
wheat, barley), precious and base metals, electricity, gas, oil, weather and other energy 
products. Whether transacted on a regulated exchange or on any other form of 
multilateral trading platform or bilaterally over-the-counter (that is, off-exchange), 
derivatives today are increasingly being used -  and used successfully -  by growing 
numbers of corporates, financial institutions, building societies, insurance companies, 
commodity groups, fund managers and other organisations. Whether the purpose of 
trading is to hedge against future adverse price movements in respect of underlying 
assets and/or portfolios, manage interest rate or exchange rate risks, or take positions 
with a view to improving profits, derivatives are and will continue to play an important 
and internationally recognised role in the world’s trading and financial systems.
1. THE DERIVATIVES TRADING ENVIRONMENT
1.1. Trading on an Exchange
Exchanges have to operate with a high level of integrity, efficiency and 
transparency in order to deliver confidence in their markets and provide for the fair 
treatment of all market users. They usually have to be licensed in their own home stale 
and be able to demonstrate continuing compliance with the requirements of that home 
state. While these requirements and the degree of accompanying oversight and 
enforcement may vary from country to country (and from exchange to exchange), their 
purpose is generally to ensure that an exchange:
> maintains high standards of integrity and fair dealing;
> facilitates a “proper market” in their instruments;
> ensures that its prices are transparent and the price formation process is 
reliable;
> has a mechanism to monitor compliance with its rules;
> has effective arrangements for the investigation of complaints;
> has financial resources sufficient to sustain proper performance;
> has a high degree of security and operational reliability and appropriate 
contingency arrangements.
These requirements are supplemented by regular liaison between exchanges 
and their licensing authorities over matters such as market supervision, the 
development of new products and strategies, enforcement and market safety and 
integrity. Each exchange will usually have a broad range of regulatory rules, practices 
and procedures designed to meet its recognition or licensing requirements and attain its 
commercial objectives, including membership rules, market regulation, contract rules 
and arbitration procedures.
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1.2. Trading Over-the-Counter
A large and increasing amount of trading in derivatives is done privately or 
“over-the-counter” (OTC) i.e. on a bilateral basis between financial institutions, 
organisations and companies. Dealings may take place on an electronic platform that 
may provide similar functionality as a regulated exchange. Such a platform may be the 
proprietary platform of a single institution (e.g. a bank or an energy trading company) 
or it may be owned or used by a consortium of financial institutions.
It should always be borne in mind that, while there is often a close interface 
between cash and commodity markets and between over-the-counter trades and 
exchange trades, OTC transactions:
> are not subject to exchange rules (although some may be incorporated in 
their terms) and should not be confused with out-of-hours trading in 
exchange contracts (which will be covered by the exchange’s rules);
> unless otherwise specified, are not subject to clearing house rules, which 
means that, unless the parties otherwise agree, they are not subject to 
margin arrangements;
> have a different risk profile to exchange-traded contracts;
> have the advantages of being able to be traded in quantities or over trading 
periods or at points of delivery or in currencies other than those quoted on 
an exchange, thereby more accurately reflecting the real risk of the 
underlying transaction (rather than using the nearest available exchange- 
traded transaction);
> may, particularly where they are unusual or complex, be more difficult to 
value and be subject to lower levels of price transparency than exchange- 
traded contracts.
1.3. The Role of Clearing House
The role of a clearing house, which may be an independently established 
organisation or a division of an exchange, is to act as a central counterparty for trades 
executed on the regulated market(s) with which it is associated. Its principal objective 
is to help “guarantee” the financial performance of trades in order to reduce 
counterparty risk, increase market liquidity and use efficient “straight-through 
processing” to maintain low settlement costs. The provision of a secure, effective and 
cost-efficient clearing service into the market place helps to protect the overall integrity 
of the market(s).
A clearing house performs its role:
> by assessing and managing member counterparty risk, delivery risk, 
banking and collateral lodgement risk and contract risk;
> by operating a centralised, automated treasury operation for the purpose of 
administering payments and receipts for the lodgement and withdrawal of
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collateral as well as the management of a multi-currency portfolio of 
significant proportions;
> by revaluing on a daily basis the novated contracts which it has entered 
into with its members and, reflecting the various price movements, 
collecting additional or “variation” margin from members whose positions 
have fallen in value and paying such margin to those whose positions have 
risen in value;
> by monitoring positions and reviewing financial reports, credit rating 
assessments and the internal controls of its member firms;
> through the settlement and delivery of netted transactions for futures and 
options markets, and the issue of netted settlement instructions to a 
Clearing and Settlement Depository (CSD) or International Clearing and 
Settlement Depository (ICSD) for equity and OTC markets.
2. RISK MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES
In general terms, risk can be defined as anything that can impede an 
organisation from achieving its strategic objectives. It encompasses not only some of 
the more predictable threats or hazards that an organisation may face, but also the 
failure to maximise opportunity or address the uncertainty of results not being as 
expected -  and is endemic in all forms of commercial or trading activity.
In order to address risk in an efficient and effective manner, the organisation
should:
> identify, on a continuing basis, all the risks relating to its activities, 
including derivatives trading activities;
> determine its appetite for risk based on the above identification of risks, 
i.e. which risks it is prepared to accept and which risks it is not prepared to 
accept;
> develop effective and well-understood policies for defining the context, 
scope and objectives for managing risk;
> develop specific responsibilities for implementing those policies;
> establish procedures for measuring, managing, mitigating and reporting on 
risk across the organisation on an ongoing basis, particularly market risk, 
credit risk, operational risk and legal risk.
While organisations around the world are focussing continually on how to 
manage risk effectively and being encouraged by regulatory agencies to implement 
robust systems and processes, the impact of globalisation and technology and the 
growing interface between products and services are not only impacting significantly 
on the management of existing risks, but are also generating new and different kinds of 
risks, making the overall quantification and management of risk that much more 
complicated.
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2.1. Types of Risk
Identifying and evaluating each of the different risks to which an organisation 
is subject is the foundation for developing and maintaining an effective control system.
Figure 1. Risks associated with derivatives
Market risk
The risk of losses due to adverse movements in, as relevant, equity, bond, 
commodity, currency and other market prices, indices or rates or changes in the 
volatility of these movements.
Credit risk
Credit risk is defined as “the risk of loss if a counterparty fails to perform its 
financial obligations to the firm”. It “is found in all activities where success depends on 
counterparty, issuer or borrower performance. It arises any time that funds are 
extended, committed, invested or otherwise exposed through actual or implied 
contractual agreements, whether reflected on or off balance sheet.”^
Operational risk
Operational risk is defined as “the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events”.2 3
2 Guide to Risk Based Supervision, Bank of England, June, 1998.
Basel Commecttc on Banking Supervision, The New Basel Capital Accord, Bank for International 
Settlement, 2001.
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Legal and documentation risk
Legal risk is the risk that an organisation, in the event of default or dispute, 
may be unable to enforce or rely on rights or obligations arising under contractual 
arrangements with its broker or counterparty. It includes specific unusual types of legal 
risk such as criminal liability and regulatory risk.
Cashflow risk
The risk that the organisation will have insufficient cash to meet regular 
margin calls necessary to sustain its position in an exchange-traded contract (e.g. where 
short-dated futures contracts are used to hedge long-dated OTC transactions or where 
additional margin calls are made intra-day).
Basis risk
The risk of loss due to a divergence in the difference between two rates or 
prices. This usually applies where an underlying physical position is hedged through 
using exchange traded futures or options contracts which are not the same as (but may 
be similar to) the commodity or property which constitutes the physical position. They 
will therefore be subject to different prices, rates or values which may change over time 
and this may have an adverse impact on the hedging arrangement. The same is true 
where short-dated contracts are used to hedge long-dated positions.
3. MANAGING MARKET RISK
Senior management should ensure that there are procedures and controls for 
derivatives in place sufficient to identify, measure, manage, mitigate and report on all 
forms o f market risk that may be generated by adverse movements in equity, bond, 
commodity, currency or other market prices, indices or rates or changes in the 
volatility o f such movements.
Senior management should ensure that all trading activities, including those in 
derivatives, are properly organised and executed in accordance with board policy and 
the organisation’s trading procedures.
Any new form of (or significant variation in) trading activity, particularly 
where new instruments or products are involved, should be subject to rigorous prior 
assessment and approval to determine appropriate parameters, controls and limits and 
ensure that any consequential risks are properly understood and within the 
organisation’s accepted level of tolerance to risk. Such assessment should cover 
accounting and control procedures, IT and systems implications, relevant legal or 
regulatory approvals, tax implications and appropriate sign-offs in all relevant areas by 
senior line management.
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3.1. Measurement of Market Risk
A consistent and readily verifiable method of measuring market risk which is 
appropriate to the scale of trading activity is essential. It should include monitoring 
transactional activity where derivatives are used so that the impact on the 
organisation’s market risk is known, understood and measured appropriately.
Before any measurement methodology is adopted, its advantages and 
shortcomings should be fully considered by the risk management function, measured 
against the nature and type of the organisation’s trading activities and assessed against 
possible alternative methodologies.
When measuring the exposures of positions, consideration should be given to 
making provisions/fair value adjustments arising from, for example, large-size 
positions which may prove difficult to unwind at other than below-market prices.
Value-at-Risk4 5 (VaR) is one of key measures for the assessment and 
monitoring of market risk. Since VaR is limited by some of its underlying assumptions 
(e.g. that the future risk can be predicted from the historical distribution of returns), the 
organisation should integrate VaR measures with all other risk indicators (e.g. scenario 
analysis and stress testing) in order to achieve a better picture of risk.6
Whether evaluating a new model or assessing the accuracy of an existing 
model, a VaR backtesting policy should be adopted to compare realised trading results 
with model generated risk measures. The most straightforward way to backtest is to 
plot the daily P&L against the predicted VaR and to monitor the number of excessions 
or departures from the agreed confidence band. Steps should be taken to identify the 
source of error if excessions are outside of the confidence band expectations.
3.2. Limit Setting
Overall organisation-wide risk limits should be developed to control exposure 
and monitor transactions and positions in accordance with the strategic appetite of the 
organisation and the nature and extent of its trading activity, the expertise of its 
individuals and the availability of netting6 or collateralisation7 techniques. For example, 
in more complex situations, specific consideration should be given to:
4 A measure of quantifying market risk based on an estimated probable (generally within a 95%-99% 
confidence level) loss over a given period of time in the value of an asset or portfolio of assets. Cf., Jorion, 
P., Value-at-Risk, 2nd cd., McGraw-Hill, New York, 2001.
5 Cf., Alexander, Carol, Risk Management and Control: New Markets and Prioducts, John Wiley & Sons, 
San Francisco, 1999.
6 The process by which a single payment obligation is derived from a number of sums owing between the 
parties.
7 Assets provided by one party (or a third party acting as a credit support provider) to the other party to secure 
payment of the first party’s obligations in relation to derivative or other transactions in the event of default. 
Collateral may also take other forms such as the provision of a guarantee by a parent organisation.
113
Tour. hosp. manag. Vol. 10, No. 3-4, Pp. 107-126
E. Mujaccvic, V. Ivanovic: RISK MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES
> notional, maturity and (VaR) limits;
> organisation-wide stress-based limits to supplement VaR limits;
> sensitivity-based limits to manage risks within specific market parameters;
> trading limits by trader/desk/country/ industry sector and currency.
3.3. Reporting and Monitoring
There should be an independent monitoring of market risk exposures versus 
limits to identify limit violations. Regular, intelligible and timely reports on trading 
activities should be prepared or checked by competent staff, independent of the 
organisation’s dealing activities, covering:8
> a reasoned description of the profit/loss and trading activity in a given 
period; of the positions at the end of that period (including relevant 
portfolio VaR analysis; and, where relevant, of the underlying 
transactions being hedged by type of product;
> details of the level of operational exceptions (for example, errors on 
timely trade capture and generally for middle/back-office operations 
statistics on confirmed/affirmed/ unconfirmed/unaffirmed transactions;
> reconciliations of all items in the trade life cycle, including cash, stock, 
unmatched and failed trades;
> utilisation against limits, giving details of any regulatory or internal limits 
breached in the period and action taken;
> where appropriate, stress test/scenario results;
> details of likely future activity, including hedging against any anticipated 
transactions.
Such reports should be circulated regularly and on a timely basis (to the board 
and senior management and any relevant responsible sub-group of directors).
A formal process should be established to ensure that market risk issues and 
VaR limit violations are escalated to the appropriate level in the organisation on a 
timely basis. The trigger levels for escalation will be based on the materiality and 
duration of the limit breach.
3.4. Independent Price Verification
In order to produce reliable market risk reports on which management 
decisions can be based, market parameters (instrument prices, data sets, interest rates 
and foreign exchange rates) fed into the approved market risk measurement and 
assessment models must be checked for integrity and reasonableness.
8 Cf., Comptroller of the Currency, Risk Management o f  Financial Derivatives, Comptroller's Handbook, 
Januray, 1997.
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Market parameters may be input into approved market risk measurement and 
assessment models manually or by automated feedscan which may give rise to manual 
input error, linkage error, systems error (when links fail) or third party input error.
Policies and procedures should be developed to identify and correct these 
errors by comparing previous sets of market parameters (i.e. closing prices and rates) to 
current end of-day market parameters, investigating the reasons behind large variations, 
and taking the appropriate action. Responsibility should be allocated to appropriate and 
skilled staff who are independent of those responsible for trade execution. If this is not 
possible, the variations should be checked or audited on a regular basis by an 
independent area such as Internal Audit.
If transactions do not have readily available market prices or are complex (e.g. 
structured OTC products), some form of independent pricing will have to be sourced 
either from within the organisation (where there is a sufficient degree of expertise to do 
so), or possibly externally from an institution other than the product provider. In the 
case of a particularly complex product, or where there is an illiquid market in a 
product, the only source of valuation may be the product provider itself. In this event, 
the valuation and the methodology used should be assessed particularly carefully by the 
organisation.
3.5. Stress Testing and Scenario Analysis
It is important that an organisation understands the effects on it of sudden 
market changes (e.g. in price, volatility, liquidity) that are outside the norm. It should 
therefore:
> analyse the organisation’s situation in the event of sudden or unpredictable 
market changes;
> put in place policies and procedures for reacting to such situations, 
including trigger points at which risk must be actively reduced and/or 
senior management should become more closely involved.
To be meaningful, stress testing and scenario analysis should be perfonned at 
multiple levels and tie back into the decision-making process. It should be discussed in 
regular forum by risk monitors, senior management and risk takers. At senior 
management level, the results should guide the organisation’s appetite for aggregate 
risk taking and influence the internal capital allocation process. At the book level, such 
tests may trigger discussions on how best to unwind or hedge a position.9
Senior management should ensure that stress testing and scenario analysis is 
carried out with such regularity that is appropriate to the overall exposure of the 
organisation, the volume and size of its trading activities and the impact upon it of 
meeting any additional margin calls or utilising available credit lines.
9 Cf., Schwartz, J. Robert and Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Derivatives Handbook: Risk Management and Control, 
John Wiley / Sons, New York, 1997.
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4. MANAGING CREDIT RISK
Senior management should ensure that there are procedures and controls for 
derivatives in place to identify, measure, manage, monitor and report on all forms o f 
credit risk to which the organisation will be exposed and secure its mitigation through 
the use o f netting and collateral arrangements or other credit enhancement techniques.
Credit risk exists in some form in most types of financial transactions. 
Transaction credit risk should not, however, be considered in isolation, but aggregated 
with credit risks arising elsewhere in the organisation so as to give a total picture. The 
organisation should therefore have in place procedures and competent staff to identify, 
analyse, measure and manage all credit risks associated with its trading activities to 
reduce, so far as possible, loss due to counterparty default and to ensure that they are 
within the organisation’s credit risk tolerance.
Credit risk should be controlled by:
> reviewing regularly the brokers and counterparties with whom an 
organisation has credit exposure or with which it places, for example, 
margin monies;
> setting limits on exposures to counterparties and brokers, as appropriate 
(taking into account the financial strength, credit worthiness and 
experience of brokers/counterparties (as well as such issues as conflicts of 
interest)), and monitoring and dealing with credit limit excesses or sudden 
margin calls caused by the effect of price movements or by the impact of 
new transactions;
> an analysis of credit exposures by counterparty taking into account, where 
appropriate, marked to market values;
> where appropriate and practicable, using enforceable netting agreements, 
collateral offsets and other credit advancement techniques, as appropriate 
and where practicable.
So far as derivatives are concerned, credit risk will vary according to, for 
example, whether the transactions are traded OTC (and where and with whom they are 
traded) or executed on or under the rules of an exchange or on any alternative market 
and whether they are cleared.
4.1. Defining and Measuring Pre-settlement and Settlement Risk
Credit risk from derivatives activity arises in two distinct ways depending on 
the phase the contract is in when one of the parties fails. It arises either before 
settlement is due (i.e. pre-settlement risk) or when settlement is due (i.e. settlement 
risk).
Pre-settlement credit risk is the risk due to the cost of replacing a derivatives 
transaction if the counterparty/customer fails during the life of the transaction, but 
before final settlement is due. It arises where trades have a positive mark to market 
(mtm) value when the counterparty fails. The marked to market value represents the
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cost of replicating the contract with another party, or, put another way, the unrealised 
profit which has to be written off.
Because trades change in value in line with market forces, the cost of 
replacing a failed transaction can also vary and for this reason pre-settlement risk is 
also sometimes called market-driven credit risk. This risk is one-sided for options, with 
only the option buyer assuming any risk, since the seller has already received value, in 
the form of the premium payment. For swaps, the risk is two-sided, since each side 
exchanges value at various points in time. The size of the pre-settlement risk is a 
reflection of the counterparty’s creditworthiness, market volatility and the length of the 
pre-settlement period (or "tenor").
The latter is the most significant factor in over-the-counter derivatives, since 
the tenor of the trade can often be one year or longer.
Pre-settlement risk exposure should be measured by summing the current 
value of the contract (the current exposure (CE)) as well an estimate of its likely future 
value (the potential future exposure (PFE)). For organisations with less complex 
derivatives activities, the minimum standard should be to estimate current exposure 
using the mark-to-market value of the transaction, and adjust this by a simple add-on 
estimate of the potential for change in mark-to-market value.10 Various standards (e.g. 
the BIS add-ons) may be used for the PFE.
These include straightforward percentage add-ons, based on the product, tenor 
or both. For organisations with large, complex derivative portfolios, PFE should be 
modelled using historical volatilities (this is known as the historical method). 
Organisations requiring a more sophisticated and encompassing approach may adopt 
measures for estimation which use simulation methods such as Monte Carlo 
simulations, but which are atypical for most endusers.
It is common even for sophisticated players to use a combination of 
approaches matching the materiality of the exposures in each product portfolio.
Settlement risk occurs when value is given without confirmation that value 
has been received in return. It materialises when a counterparty fails before it can 
deliver countervalue, leaving the organisation to pursue its claim for payment as an 
unsecured creditor. The risk lasts from the point at which an irrevocable instruction has 
been given to pay funds away until irrevocable confirmation that value has been 
received. This risk exists in some form for all trading activities at the point of trade 
settlement. The fundamental differences between settlement risk and pre-settlement 
risk are that the window of time over which settlement risk exists is typically much 
shorter (e.g. 2 days), much greater in magnitude, more certain (in the sense that the 
amount is fixed and easily identifiable), and it represents a loss of cash rather than 
unrealised profit.11
10 Cf., Smithson, C. W., Credit Portfolio Management, John Wiley & Sons, New Jork, 2003.
11 Cf., Basel Commeette on Banking Supervision, Risk Management Guidelines for Derivatives, Bank for 
International Settlement, 1994.
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For most end-users, settlement risk exposure should be measured as 100% of 
the value to be received (e.g. the value of the security or cash flow due at settlement). 
Potential change in value over the settlement process is generally not a critical issue, 
except for complex portfolios comprising transactions with particularly long settlement 
period windows.
4.2. Netting and Collateral
The use of netting agreements and collateral offsets to mitigate credit risk are 
recommended, where practicable, as good proactive credit risk management practice. 
However, an organisation should first consider the costs of arranging the legal 
agreements, confirming their legal enforceability, establishing the methodologies and 
systems capability necessary to calculate net exposure and employing sufficiently 
competent staff to monitor, control and perfect collateral on a daily basis. For many 
end-users, particularly those with few derivative transactions or those dealing in one- 
off transactions with a number of different counterparties/customers, the cost may 
outweigh the benefit if the use of these arrangements is expected to result in 
insignificant reductions in pre-settlement credit risk exposure.
Payment netting is a mechanism designed to limit settlement credit risk, by 
which the parties agree that if, on any date, amounts are payable between them in the 
same currency under the same transaction or a specified group of transactions (as the 
parties may agree), then such payment obligations are to be determined on a net (and 
not gross) basis. Prior to agreeing to its application, organisations should consider 
carefully the extent to which payment netting is to apply i.e. whether it should apply to 
obligations under one and the same transaction or across transactions, bearing in mind 
that this is largely a matter of law, regulation and systems capability.
“Close-out” netting is a mechanism designed to reduce net pre-settlement 
exposure in the event of counterparty failure. It applies only upon early termination of 
the transactions upon an event of default whereby obligations (whether for payment or 
delivery) under all outstanding transactions, entered into pursuant to the relevant 
master agreement, are required to be terminated, valued and converted (if appropriate) 
into the termination currency agreed by the parties, and determined on a net (rather 
than gross) basis. It is designed to stop liquidators cherry picking contracts and 
avoiding payment on unprofitable transactions (i.e. where the failed counterparty owes 
money).
When providing for close-out netting in the relevant master agreement, 
organisations should adopt a “full two-way” (as distinct from a “limited two-way”) 
payments approach (an additional option provided under some Master Netting 
Agreements12), which means that if the close-out calculation results in an amount 
payable by one party to the other, that first party is obliged to make the payment 
regardless of whether the other party is the defaulting party. On the other hand, under 
the “limited two-way” payments approach, the first party is not required to make any
12 Cf., Harding, P. C., Mastering the ISDA Master Agreements (1992 and 2002): A Practical Guide for 
Negotiation, Financial Times -Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 2003.
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such payment if the other party is the defaulting party. The “full two-way” payments 
mechanism is increasingly recognised in the market as the preferred approach. Many 
perceive it to be a fairer mechanism and that regulatory capital benefits, which flow 
from using a netting agreement, will not be available if “limited two-way payments” is 
used.
Organisations should be aware that the issue of close-out netting often raises 
complex issues of enforceability, particularly in relation to entities organised overseas.
Many banks and brokers will demand that collateral be provided in relation to 
OTC derivatives transactions. A customer with considerable bargaining power (e.g. 
through a stronger credit rating than that enjoyed by many banks and brokers) may be 
able to insist on mutualised collateral arrangements. If a pre-agreed number is hit, other 
collateral must be provided by one party to the other or, less commonly, by each party 
to the other simultaneously.
The terms on which collateral is provided must be examined closely. Can it be 
pledged by the broker to a third party such as a clearing house? Is it co-mingled with 
property belonging to the broker or to other clients of the broker?
4.3. Credit Risk on Over-the-Counter (OTC) Transactions
In the case of OTC transactions, both pre-settlement and settlement credit risk 
arise. Generally, settlement risk is monitored and controlled separately from pre­
settlement risk and other credit risks such as repayment risk. Pre-settlement and other 
non-settlement credit risks are usually aggregated by counterparty and the total picture 
of exposure considered when setting credit limits. To achieve this, the credit risk 
inherent in a position stated on a basis that is equivalent to the credit risk inherent in a 
lending transaction -  this is achieved by adding together the CE and PFE to create total 
exposure (TE), a risk amount which is regarded as a loan equivalent exposure, 
sometime called credit equivalent exposure (CEE).13 It is good practice to set limits on 
the aggregate CEE permitted for all derivative transactions, and to set such limits 
taking into consideration the range and aggregate amount of credit risks which arise 
through other transactions (such as placement of deposits or lending).
Settlement risk for different transactions involving the same counterparty are 
usually controlled by way of daily settlement limits. These limits measure the total 
settlement amount due on any particular day across all transactions. Although it is good 
practice to measure the risk from the point at which irrevocable payment instructions 
are issued to the point at which counter value receipt is confirmed, it is common for 
systems to be unable to identify these points with certainty. Daily settlement limits 
therefore commonly operate on an assumption that settlement takes a certain average, 
or sometimes worst case, number of days and apply the limit utilisation accordingly, 
with manual adjustments for trade fails.
13 Cf., Arvanitis, A. and J. Gregory, Credit.' The Complete Guide to Pricing, Hedging and Risk Management, 
Risk Books, London, 2001.
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Where such assumptions are made in the programming of daily settlement 
limit systems, it is good practice for organisations to understand the limitations of the 
assumptions and to check periodically that they remain sound.
For OTC derivatives it is therefore important to understand that transactions 
use both presettlement and settlement limit capacity. There are two limits which 
therefore have to be respected before a trade can be accommodated. In this way, credit 
exposure is managed within tolerance levels both before and at settlement. At present, 
most OTC transactions proceed uncleared and without either party placing cash margin 
or any form of collateral with the other as security for its obligations. However, if an 
OTC transaction is cleared or an organisation does place margin or collateral with its 
counterparty, credit risk issues similar to those arising in connection with exchange- 
traded contracts are likely to exist.14
4.4. Credit Risk on Exchange-Traded Transactions
It is a common perception that exchange-traded derivatives carry no credit 
risk. In reality, while the transparency of an exchange’s price mechanism, coupled with 
daily marking to market of positions, may reduce risk, it does not eliminate credit risk.
The risk management function provided through the monitoring and 
margining procedures of clearing houses/clearing divisions of exchanges is an 
important benefit to the market as a whole. Indeed, a clearing house/division of an 
exchange will generally stand behind a transaction (either as a counterparty to it once 
the transaction is cleared or by some other “guarantee” arrangement). In some markets, 
the benefit of this “guarantee” may be extended to cover a broker’s customers. More 
usually, the benefit of clearing is restricted to the exchange member through whom the 
customer organisation will gain exchange access and execute its transactions so the 
organisation will not itself enjoy the benefit of any clearing “guarantee” i.e. the 
organisation’s real credit risk will be with the broker.
Credit risk arises in such circumstances by virtue of the fact that margin 
payments are paid to the broker and may be lost if the broker fails.
5. MANAGING OPERATIONAL RISK
Senior management should ensure that procedures and controls for 
derivatives are in place to identify, measure, manage, monitor, report on and, where 
practical, mitigate operational risk, including technological risk.
14 Cf., Smithson C.W., and C.W. Smith, Jr., The Handbook o f Financial Engineering, Harper & Row, New 
York, 1990.
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Operational Risk is defined as the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events15.
Senior management should have oversight responsibility to identify and 
analyse all types of existing and potential operational risks faced by the organisation, 
which may arise from, for example16:
> the introduction and development of new products;
> changes in management and/or the organisation’s operations;
> the management of third parties, particularly in the context of the 
outsourcing and procurement of IT services;
> the development, introduction, security and use (and failure) of automated 
systems, particularly in relation to key business processes;
> human resource failures, particularly as regards people-related processes 
such as recruitment and training of staff;
> any loss in business continuity due to events such as natural disasters, 
terrorist acts;
> changes in regulatory and/or legal environment.
Having identified and analysed areas of potential operational risks, senior 
management should ensure that appropriate internal controls and procedures are 
established to measure, manage, monitor, mitigate and report on such risks on a 
continuing basis, including:
> setting risk indicators and limits for operational areas (e.g. to ensure senior 
managers are advised of any escalation in risk);
> carrying out independent internal audits to assure management of the 
adequacy and effectiveness of the organisation’s controls and procedures;
> ensuring segregation of duties, confirmations and reconciliations, reporting 
and monitoring. For example, individuals responsible for entering into 
derivatives transactions should be segregated from those responsible for 
transaction processing, calculating profit and loss, monitoring risk, 
perfonning reconciliations and transactional reporting;
> timely reporting covering:
• details of authorised and unauthorised changes in and/or access to IT 
systems;
• information on staff issues, e.g. turnover rates, disciplinary events 
and changes in individual responsibilities;
• trading activities.
15 Basel Commccttc on Banking Supervision, The New Basel Capital Accord, Bank for International 
Settlement, 2001.
16 Basel Commeette on Banking Supervision, Sound Prectices for the Management and Supervision o f 
Operational Risk, Bank for International Settlement, September, 2003.
121
Tour. hosp. manag. Vol. 10, No. 3-4, Pp. 107-126
E. Mujacevic, V. Ivanovic: RISK MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES
5.1. IT Systems Management
Computer systems used for the initial recording, processing, valuing and risk 
modelling of derivatives transactions should be subject to the same procedures and 
controls as other systems used by the organisation. In particular, there should be a 
systems outline that sets out how the systems used for any process within the life cycle 
of a derivatives trade are controlled. Any such outline should include:
> systems and data architecture, setting out the interfaces between the 
various systems;
> clear levels of responsibility have been assigned, particularly over systems 
development, system operation, technical support and security 
administration;
> logical access to system programs and data is limited to authorised 
individuals (including the use of firewalls and encryption technology 
where the organisation is connected to the external environment); and 
access violation attempts are monitored and reported;
> physical access to computer equipment, storage media and programme 
documentation is limited to authorised individuals through the use of 
appropriate security devices;
> estimations are made (and periodically reviewed) of current and future 
systems capacity, based on current utilisation levels and anticipated growth 
rates, to ensure that adequate processing and capacity continues to be 
available at each processing location;
> systems processing is scheduled appropriately and deviations are identified 
and resolved in a timely manner;
> systems disaster recovery plans are developed, updated and tested 
regularly to enable the organisation to recover systems and data in a timely 
manner, and aligned to the organisation’s business continuity plans;
> clear change control procedures are in place and adhered to when system 
developments, modifications and testing are being made.
In cases where spreadsheets and/or manual workarounds are used for reports 
(for example, for position keeping or valuation), procedures should be developed to 
ensure that access is carefully controlled and the spreadsheets are used only for their 
intended purpose. In addition, independent validation of the models underlying the 
spreadsheets and/or manual workarounds should be carried out to ensure that these 
models are tested, reliable and consistent with the standards of external models.
An organisation should ensure that its business strategy is translated into 
specific system requirements so that systems needs can be analysed and specified and 
appropriate systems selected. Once specified, design and development activity should 
ensure that systems are developed to a consistent standard and that systems 
documentation provides for long-term support and maintenance. Successful 
implementation of systems requires adequate testing, quality assurance, change 
controls and project management to ensure that systems meet business requirements on 
time and within budget. In addition, the development, planning and testing of
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contingency and disaster recovery strategies are crucial to ensure the timely recovery of 
key business processes and supporting systems.
5.2. Use of Electronic Order Routing Systems
Derivatives transactions are increasingly being conducted electronically and 
more and more business operations are able to process transactions from start to finish 
with minimal manual intervention. Direct connectivity with third parties (such as 
brokers) through the use of electronic order routing systems (EORS) is now 
commonplace. Although use of these systems can deliver many advantages to the end- 
user (e.g. more cost efficient and rapid transaction processing), dealing activities must 
be monitored closely to ensure that transactions are processed completely, accurately, 
on time and without duplication. It is also vital that controls are built into the systems 
covering, for example, trade input, verification and release to minimise errors and 
unauthorised trading. Management should also be able to access real time information 
about the precise status of each transaction and monitoring systems should be capable 
of providing early warning of potential difficulties in processing.
Given the extent of and the degree of reliance based upon automation, all 
electronic systems should be subject to thorough testing prior to implementation.
When using EORS, due attention should be given to the following:
> Lack of compatibility -  the organisation must ensure that it meets the IT 
hardware specifications and network configuration recommended by the 
EORS provider, as this can directly affect the EORS’s performance;
> Adequate training -  the organisation should ensure that all EORS users are 
aware that efficient performance can be inhibited by their own activities 
e.g. running additional software applications on dedicated EORS 
hardware. As a result, reference to best practice user guides issued by the 
EORS provider is essential. The effective communication of these best 
practice criteria to EORS users through training will help maximise 
EORS’s performance;
> Security risk -  the EORS provider will accept no liability for a systems 
failure that results from the introduction of viruses or similar items by an 
employee of the organisation (and may hold the organisation liable and 
seek appropriate damages). The organisation must ensure therefore that it 
has adequate procedures in place to raise awareness of the dangers of 
viruses and to minimise the risks of their introduction into the system.
> Security features should be in place to restrict trading access to authorised 
personnel only (e.g. through the use of user names and passwords) and 
there should be procedures for managing access to and invalidating codes 
when authorised personnel leave the organisation;
> Systems failure and contingency arrangements -  in the event of a systems 
failure, the organisation must ensure that it can swiftly access alternative
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mechanisms to support its trading activities. Particular care should be 
taken to check whether individual orders were executed prior to the 
systems failure before re-entering them via the back-up system;
>  Incorrect or erroneous orders -  directly inputting orders via an EORS 
exposes the organisation to potential losses where orders are incorrectly 
submitted to the exchange’s central order book. To minimise these risks, it 
is vital that authorised personnel are properly trained in the use of the 
EORS and are aware of the procedure for correcting/amending incorrectly 
or erroneously entered orders.
When accessing a derivatives exchange electronically, an organisation must 
ensure that it is able to comply with both the letter and the spirit of that exchange’s 
rules and regulations. The organisation must therefore have procedures in place 
whereby all employees authorised to use an EORS become familiar with and are able 
to access directly all applicable rules and regulations and any changes that may be 
introduced to those rules and regulations.
5.3. Reputational Risk
While reputational risk is often excluded from the definition of operational 
risk (for example, the New Basle Capital Accord excludes reputational risk for the 
purpose of calculating capital requirements), recent headline cases such as those 
involving lack of accounting transparency shows that any form of adverse publicity or 
perception about the organisation (whether justified or not) which damages its 
reputation can increase significantly its risk and/or its cost base in some of its key 
activities resulting in, for example, the withdrawal of credit lines, loss of customers, 
loss of key staff, the impact of tighter regulatory controls, loss of investment 
confidence and withdrawal of third party suppliers.
In such circumstances, there has to be careful management of any contact with 
press, the development of an informed working relationship with any relevant 
regulatory authority and a very close focus on retaining the goodwill and support of 
customers and suppliers. Aside from general matters of administration and normal 
communications, contact should be restricted to or managed centrally by senior 
managers during the time of crisis.
CONCLUSION
The increasing sophistication of the capital markets and the creativity of 
investment bankers and other financial institutions have fostered the introduction and 
use of a wide variety of complex financial instruments and structured financial 
transactions. Most organisations now use these kinds of transactions, which involve the 
use of derivatives, to hedge exposures or manage portfolios more efficiently. However, 
the lesson for others has been that, if used inappropriately or for excessive speculative 
gain, they can also generate significant losses. While it is true that, when measured
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against the enormous volume of business undertaken worldwide, large losses are 
comparatively few in number, the size of them has sometimes been unacceptably high.
The causative factors are usually any or all of the following: excessive 
position-taking (in relation to capital), unexpected market moves, fraud, ineffective risk 
management controls, inadequacies in corporate policy governing their use and/or 
insufficient product understanding.
The problem for organisations is that by omitting to use derivatives 
(prudently) for hedging purposes, they may be speculating with underlying values in a 
way which can be just as risky and dangerous as using derivatives inexpertly or 
imprudently. This means that the board directors could be construed as failing in their 
duty to act in the best interests of their companies if, through lack of knowledge, they 
omit to manage risk which ought to be managed. Conversely, they may also be failing 
in their duty to so act if they permit the organisation to take positions in these 
instruments without having the proper controls or staff in place.
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Sažetak
UPRAVLJANJE RIZIKOM FINANCIJSKIH DERIVATA
Financijski derivati pojavljuju se u mnogo oblika uključujući futures ugovore, terminske ugovore, swap-ove, 
opcije, strukturirane zajmovne obligacije i depozite, te i u raznim kombinacijama navedenih instrumenata. 
Pojedinim derivatima trguje se na organiziranim tržištima, dok se ostalim derivatima neposredno negocira. 
Derivati su postali integrirani dio financijskog tržišta zbog toga što oni imaju nekoliko ekonomskih f  unkcija. 
Derivati se mogu koristiti za smanjenje poslovnog rizika, kao sredstva trgovine za ostvarenje dobiti, za 
smanjenje troškova kapitala i financiranja, te za promjenu odnosa rizičnosti i dobiti pojedinih stavaka u 
bilanci stanja.
Iako su derivati legitimna i vrijedna oruđa za banke i korporacije, oni kao i svi ostali financijski instrumenti 
sadrže određeni rizik kojim se mora upravljati. Rizici povezani sa derivatima nisu novi u odnosu na druge 
rizike. U stvari to su rizici koji se pojavljuju i kod ostalih tradicionalnih aktivnosti (npr. rizik cijene, kamatne 
stope, likvidnosti, kreditni rizik). U osnovi rizici povezani sa derivatima su funkcija vremena i varijabilnosti 
novčanog tijeka. Stoga je  veoma važno razumjeti razne rizične faktore koji su povezani sa poslovnim 
aktivnostima te prema tome i uspostaviti primjerene sisteme za identifikaciju, mjerenje, monitoring i kontrolu 
izloženosti rizicima koji su povezani sa derivatima.
Ključne riječi: financijski derivati, rizik, tržišni rizik, kreditni rizik, operativni rizik.
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